

























 UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE 
 
  WORKING PAPER SERIES IN ECONOMICS 
No. 39
MANAGERS AND STUDENTS AS NEWSVENDORS -





Managers and Students as Newsvendors 
 















University of Cologne, Germany 
 
 




We compare how freshmen business students, graduate business students and 
experienced procurement managers perform on a simple inventory ordering task.  
We find that, qualitatively, managers exhibit ordering behavior similar to 
students, including biased ordering towards average demand. Experience, 
however, affects subjects’ utilization of information. The managers’ work 
experience seems most valuable when there is only historical demand data to 
guide decision making, while students better utilize analytical information and 
task training. As a result, when information necessary to solve the problem to 
optimality is added to historical information, students catch up to the managers, 
and students with classroom experience in operations management outperform 
managers. 
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1  Introduction 
How do work and classroom experiences affect managerial decision making? Here we 
examine this question in the context of the newsvendor problem, a foundational paradigm in 
management science. In the problem’s most basic form, the newsvendor faces stochastic demand 
for a perishable product. Prior to seeing the actual demand draw, she must decide how much of 
the product to stock in inventory. Her realized profit is a function of the unit cost, the unit 
revenue, the order quantity and the realized demand.  A key insight from the theoretical analysis 
of the newsvendor problem is that the order quantity that maximizes expected profit depends on 
a comparison of the marginal costs associated with being over and under stocked (Arrow et al. 
1951).  
Laboratory studies of the newsvendor problem provide descriptive insight into the intuitive 
judgments and information handling behind stocking behavior. These studies, mostly performed 
on college students, find that orders tend to be biased away from the expected profit maximizing 
order and towards the average demand, an effect known as “anchoring bias.” This bias is at odds 
not only with expected profit maximization but also with alternative risk profiles (Schweitzer 
and Cachon 2000, Schultz et al. 2007). The bias persists for a variety of demand distributions 
(Benzion et al. 2008).  It is influenced by task complexity and framing (Kremer, Minner and 
Wassenhove 2007).  
Anchoring bias has proven robust to a variety of in-task experiences. It persists even with 
substantial task repetition, and descriptive statistical information on the performance of chosen 
or foregone orders has little positive influence (Bolton and Katok 2008). More frequent feedback 
can actually degrade performance (Lurie and Swaminathan 2007). While here is a good deal of 
heterogeneity in the individual ordering patterns behind anchoring bias (Moritz 2008), a common 
feature involves adaptive learning-by-doing behavior that insufficiently adjusts orders to the 
optimum, even when the experiment provides demand distribution and profit information 
amenable to deductive insight. The data shows fit with bounded rationality models of adaptive 
learning (Bostian, Holt and Smith 2008), decision noise and optimization error (Su 2008), and 
overconfidence bias in which subjects underestimate the variance in demand (Croson, Croson 
and Ren 2008).
1   
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive survey of newsvendor experiments, see Kremer and Minner (2008). Other recent work, using 
somewhat different methods for analyzing the newsvendor problem, also finds behavior that deviates from theory. In  
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Our experiment examines the influence of out-of-task experience on newsvendor 
performance. Both classroom and managerial experience can be expected to influence judgment 
and information handling, although perhaps in different ways. Classroom treatment of the 
newsvendor problem exposes students to the broad principles underlying inventory control. 
Actual procurement experience, which typically comes in addition to classroom experience, 
provides intensive exposure to practical inventory problems. Procurement managers are also 
subject to market selection pressure. So we might expect managers and students to approach the 
newsvendor problem differently. 
The experiment samples three experiential groups: freshman business students who have had 
no course in operations management, graduate business students who have had at least one 
undergraduate course in operations management, and working managers with practical 
experience in newsvendor-type procurement. The managers in our sample all have at least one 
year of experience in newsvendor-type purchasing, with an average of 7.5 years of experience. 
Their positions at the time of the study ranged from buyer to company vice president. Since the 
ability to handle information is critical here, the experiment is designed to expose subjects to 
varying levels of information and task training so that we can examine how the interaction of 
information and out-of-task experience influences ordering performance. The specific questions 
we investigate are: 
What experience leads to the best use of historical information? Most of the previous studies 
provided subjects with the information about the underlying demand distribution necessary to 
solve the problem to optimality. In the first phase of our experiment, we provide subjects with 
only historical information about demand, the kind of information condition that managers often 
face in the field.  
What experience leads to the best use of analytical information? In our experiment, 
analytical information is phased in (after exposure to historical data) beginning with information 
on the demand distribution and then information regarding the expected profit of orders. Both 
levels of information are sufficient to identify the expected profit maximizing order, but the latter 
                                                                                                                                                             
an experiment, Brown and Tang (2006) find evidence for maximization of minimum profit and minimization of 
maximum loss. Using survey techniques, Corbett and Fransoo (2007) find that entrepreneurs and small businesses 
make inventory decisions that are consistent in some regards with the newsvendor model but inconsistent with 
regard to others. Inventory management has been studied in relationship to supply chain behavioral anomalies such 
as the bullwhip effect; see for example, Croson and Donohue (2006).  
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requires less deduction. Thus the experiment allows us to compare analytical sophistication 
among experience groups. 
What experience leads to the best use of task training? Most subjects in the previous studies 
were unfamiliar with the newsvendor problem or at least assumed so. Where students were 
familiar, there was a significant lag between classroom experience and laboratory study. The 
training in our experiment is on-the-spot. It provides the tools necessary to determine the 
expected profit maximizing solution as well as an explanation for the underlying reasoning, 
distinguishing it from the flat provision of expected profit information. 
We find that experience affects subjects’ utilization of both historical and analytical 
information. Managers exhibit somewhat less anchoring bias in Period 1 of the task with only 
historical demand data for guidance and prior to receiving feedback on ones own performance. 
With the addition of analytical information or training, however, students catch up, and those 
with an operations management education, outperform the managers. The findings have 
implications for what we can expect from experienced managerial judgment as well as the 
conditions under which education and training are likely to be most successful. 
While ours is the first study to examine the role of managerial experience in newsvendor 
problems, there have been studies of the influence of experience on other kinds of decision tasks. 
Seigel and Harnett (1964) compared the performance of corporate employees and students on a 
simple bargaining task and found no appreciable difference. Burns (1985) found that real world 
auction bidders tend to make more mistakes in the experimental auction than students. Cooper et 
al. (1999) compared the performance of Chinese students and Chinese managers on a task 
involving the ‘rachet effect’, the tendency for administrators to increase the work quota on those 
who have proven to be most productive in the past. They found that the managers play more 
strategically – but only when the game is framed in natural environment terms, not when it is 
framed in abstract terms. We will observe yet a different pattern in our study, although when 
taken together, a coherent picture of the role of experience begins to emerge (see Section 4). 
Section 2 provides a description of the experiment. Section 3 lays out the data analysis and 
detailed findings. Section 4 discusses implications and concludes. 
  
  4
2  Method 
The experiment has six treatments. Within each treatment, subjects play the same 
newsvendor game with phased information, explained in Subsection 2.1. Across treatments, we 
manipulate the experience subjects have as well as whether they get task training, explained in 
Subsection 2.2. Details of the experimental protocol are reviewed in Subsection 2.3. Table 1 
provides an overview of the activities within a treatment.  
 














2.1  The newsvendor game 
 
All treatments involve a 100 period newsvendor game with the same demand and economic 
parameters, and such that expected profits are maximized at an order quantity of 75 (equivalent 
to 75 percent of the maximum possible period demand). To simplify comparisons, all 
newsvendors faced the same sequence of independent draws. 
Subjects in all treatments received the same basic pre-play briefing on the structure of the 
game (item 2 of Table 1). In synopsis: The purchase price to be paid for buying a unit of the 
“generic product” is 3 talers per unit and it can be sold to customers for 12 talers per unit. At the 
beginning of each of the 100 periods, the subject chooses an order quantity, after which demand 
for the period is revealed and profits are calculated. The briefing provides examples to illustrate 
profit calculation. Subjects are told that any unsold inventory remaining at the end of the period 
Activity
1. Task training (not included in all 
treatments)
2. Information: Briefing and sample 
demand
3. Ordering: Phase 1 = Periods 1 – 40 
4. Information: Demand distribution 
5. Ordering: Phase 2 = Periods 41 – 80
6. Information: Optimal solution 
7. Ordering: Phase 3 = Periods 81 – 100
8. Payment
Description
In treatments with „Task training“, subjects watch a one-
hour video on the newsvendor problem. In all other 
treatments, this activity is entirely omitted
Subjects read a two page briefing, including a graph 
showing the demand of the previous 50 periods 
(Appendix A.1)
Subjects place 40 orders, receiving feedback after each 
order (Appendix A.2) 
Subjects receive a handout stating that demand is 
uniformly distributed between 1 and 100 and uncorrelated
Subjects place 40 orders, receiving feedback after each 
order. The process is the same as in Phase 1
Subjects receive a handout with a graph that shows how 
the expected profit of a period depends on the order 
quantity
Subjects place 20 orders, receiving feedback after each 
order. The process is the same as in Phases 1 and 2
Subjects are paid based on the performance across all 
100 Periods
Activity
1. Task training (not included in all 
treatments)
2. Information: Briefing and sample 
demand
3. Ordering: Phase 1 = Periods 1 – 40 
4. Information: Demand distribution 
5. Ordering: Phase 2 = Periods 41 – 80
6. Information: Optimal solution 
7. Ordering: Phase 3 = Periods 81 – 100
8. Payment
Description
In treatments with „Task training“, subjects watch a one-
hour video on the newsvendor problem. In all other 
treatments, this activity is entirely omitted
Subjects read a two page briefing, including a graph 
showing the demand of the previous 50 periods 
(Appendix A.1)
Subjects place 40 orders, receiving feedback after each 
order (Appendix A.2) 
Subjects receive a handout stating that demand is 
uniformly distributed between 1 and 100 and uncorrelated
Subjects place 40 orders, receiving feedback after each 
order. The process is the same as in Phase 1
Subjects receive a handout with a graph that shows how 
the expected profit of a period depends on the order 
quantity
Subjects place 20 orders, receiving feedback after each 
order. The process is the same as in Phases 1 and 2
Subjects are paid based on the performance across all 
100 Periods 
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is “worthless” and not carried over to the next period. Subjects were also told the taler-to-euro 
exchange rate that would determine their total game earnings at the end of play. In addition, 
managers were asked for some biographical data. 
The experiment phases in information about the game parameterization and newsvendor 
analysis. The briefing pointed out that new information would be added in three phases, before 
the first period, after the 40
th period and after the 80
th period, although the nature of this 
information was not discussed prior to introduction.  
 
Phase 1. Sample demands: Before they place their first order, all subjects are presented with 
demands of 50 hypothetical periods that took place prior to the game, and are told that the first 
order they place is for the next period (period 51 of Figure 1). They are not told what distribution 
generated the draws.  
 





















Phase 2. Demand information: After 40 periods, subjects receive the demand distribution 
information in Figure 2. Demand is drawn from a uniform distribution between 1 and 100 and 
independent between periods. With this, there is sufficient information to compute the expected 























































































































































The graph shows the customer demand over the previous 50 periods. This demand data was generated with the 
same approach that is used for generating demands in the experiment






















































































































































The graph shows the customer demand over the previous 50 periods. This demand data was generated with the 






















































































































































The graph shows the customer demand over the previous 50 periods. This demand data was generated with the 
same approach that is used for generating demands in the experiment
Customer Demand over Previous 50 Periods 
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Figure 2. Information provided to subject after period 40 
 
 
To create a customer demand the computer draws in each period a random number between 1 
and 100. All customer demands between 1 and 100 are equally likely.  
  
The demand of the current period is independent of the demand of the previous period. Therefore 
low or high demands in previous periods do not affect the demands of the following periods. 
 
       
Phase 3. Expected profit information: After another 40 periods (so prior to period 81), subjects 
are presented the graph in Figure 3, which shows the expected profit as a function of the order 
quantity. The graph shows the order quantity (75) that results in the maximum expected profit. 
While the profit information is redundant in the sense that it could already be derived from the 
demand information, it is probably not redundant for (some) human subjects, who may have 
difficulty transforming demand information into the relevant expected profit information (which 
is in fact confirmed by the data as we show below). 
 
Figure 3. Expected profit information provided to subjects after period 80 
 
This graph presents the results of a simulation. It shows the average profit of a period if an order quantity of x is 
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If you decide to order x = 10 
units in each period, your 
average profit is 84 Taler
If you decide to order x = 90 
units in each period, your 
average profit is 329 Taler
If you decide to order x = 75 
units in each period, your 
average profit is 342 Taler
Optimization Information
This graph presents the results of a simulation. It shows the average profit of a period if an order quantity of x is 
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If you decide to order x = 10 
units in each period, your 
average profit is 84 Taler
If you decide to order x = 90 
units in each period, your 
average profit is 329 Taler
If you decide to order x = 75 
units in each period, your 




2.2  Treatment manipulations: Experience and training 
The experiment has a fully crossed 3 X 2 design for a total of six treatments. One factor that 
distinguishes treatments is the experience the subjects have. This factor has three levels:   
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  Freshmen: Freshmen business students who have not yet had classroom education in 
operations management and are unlikely to have had work experience in purchasing.  
  Graduates: Master degree students who have taken at least one operations management 
course and have completed their undergraduate studies in business administration. They 
are unlikely to have had much work experience in purchasing. 
  Managers: Purchasing managers who have worked for at least one year in a line position 
making newsvendor-type decisions, such as ordering promotion items. 80% of the 
subjects were recruited from German retailers, 20% from German industry. Table 2 
provides a breakdown by experience and position held at the time of the experiment. 
 










The second factor that distinguishes treatments is whether subjects are given task training 
just prior to playing the game. This factor has two levels: 
•  Basic: At the beginning of the game, subjects receive the briefing described in 
Subsection 2.1 but no further training.  
•  Task Training: In addition to the basic briefing, subjects receive a 60 minute video 
lecture on how to analyze demands and how to determine optimal order quantities. The 
video states that often there exists a tendency of people to order towards the mean 
demand and explains why that is wrong. It then explains how an optimal order quantity 
can be determined in settings such as the one of the experiment, where the optimal order 
quantity is simply the profit margin multiplied by the maximum demand. After the video, 
subjects are asked to determine the optimal order quantity for an example (Figure 4). The 
answers are collected. The video then continues and provides the correct answer. In the 
experiment, all subjects answered the question correctly. The training is provided before 
Position                                
 Vice President       5
 Manager              14
 Team Leader         7
 Buyer                   23
Work Experience
 1 – 2 years          9
 3 – 4 years        14
 5 – 6 years          6
 7 – 10 years        8
 11 – 15 years      6
 16 – 20 years      4
 21 – 25 years      1
 25 – 30 years      1
Position                                
 Vice President       5
 Manager              14
 Team Leader         7
 Buyer                   23
Work Experience
 1 – 2 years          9
 3 – 4 years        14
 5 – 6 years          6
 7 – 10 years        8
 11 – 15 years      6
 16 – 20 years      4
 21 – 25 years      1
 25 – 30 years      1
Position                                
 Vice President       5
 Manager              14
 Team Leader         7
 Buyer                   23
Work Experience
 1 – 2 years          9
 3 – 4 years        14
 5 – 6 years          6
 7 – 10 years        8
 11 – 15 years      6
 16 – 20 years      4
 21 – 25 years      1
 25 – 30 years      1 
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the game, immediately before the basic information is presented.
2 All slides shown in the 
video were available during the video and during the experiment. We decided to use a 
video as opposed to presenting the slides to ensure consistency of the information 
provided to the subjects. 
 






A key distinction between task training and the provision of expected profit information in Phase 
3 of the experiment is that training explains the rationale behind the optimal order quantity 
calculation and differentiates it from the common anchoring mistake that people are prone to. 
 
2.3  Laboratory protocol 
The experiment was conducted in Germany. A total of 164 people participated. Each subject 
participated in exactly one session. A breakdown by treatment appears in Table 3. Cash was the 
only incentive offered. Subjects were recruited from two sources. Experienced managers were 
recruited from companies associated with the Department of Supply Chain Management of the 
University of Cologne. These sessions were conducted on site at the companies. Students were 
recruited from the subject pool of the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) with 
the help of the recruitment software ORSEE (Greiner 2004). These sessions were conducted at 
the University of Cologne.  
The game software was created by the Laboratory for Economic Management and Auctions 
(LEMA) at the Smeal College of Business, Penn State University. Snapshots of a typical 
newsvendor computer screen appear in Appendix A.2. The screens displayed information about 
the outcomes in prior periods of the game, including demand realization, the order placed, and 
the resulting profit, as well as the current total profit accumulated since the start of the session. 
The experiment’s software was web-based php application with a mySQL back end. 
At the end of the session, subjects were paid their total game earnings (includes all 100 
decisions) at a rate of 1 Euro per 44 taler for Freshmen and Graduates and 1 Euro per 11 taler for 
                                                 
2 The video is available at http://www.wiso.uni-koeln.de/scmms/multimedialecture.zip. 
The selling price is 10 €/unit. The unit cost is 4 €/unit. All demands between 11 and 20 
have a probability of 10 %. Demands between periods are independent.
a) How high is the profit margin?
b) How high is the optimal order quantity? 
The selling price is 10 €/unit. The unit cost is 4 €/unit. All demands between 11 and 20 
have a probability of 10 %. Demands between periods are independent.
a) How high is the profit margin?
b) How high is the optimal order quantity?  
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Managers. Freshmen and Graduates received an additional 10 Euros if they received task 
training. This additional payment was not offered to Managers, because it would have resulted in 
total payments that would have been taxable under German law. Sessions lasted between 50 and 
60 minutes, both for students and managers, plus 60 minutes in those sessions with training. 
Students received a participation fee of 2.50 Euros and actual average earnings were about 10 




3  Results 
We organize the data analysis along the lines of the three broad research questions laid 
out in the Introduction. We refer to the order that maximizes expected profits as the optimal 
order quantity (= 75 units). The analysis focuses on two measures of newsvendor performance. 
The first is order quantity (or just ‘order’). The second is efficiency, defined as ‘the average 
profit that would have been achieved with the order quantity chosen by the subject’ divided by 
‘the average profit achieved with an optimal order quantity’. Efficiency is an interesting 
additional performance indicator because it penalizes for order variability; for example, ordering 
75 every period is a more efficient strategy than alternating orders of 100 and of 50.  
  The unit of analysis for all of our inferential statistical tests will be the individual subject. 
Table 3 provides a breakout of the number of subjects in each treatment.  Table 3 also displays 
some summary statistics for the data. We will refer back to this table in the inferential analysis. 
For now, note the treatment nomenclature and subject sample sizes. The table also provides a 
‘thirty thousand feet’ view of the data (the means in the table aggregate over all phases of the 
game). Even at this distance, one can see shifts with regard to experience and training.  
 
                                                 
3 10 Euro were about 14 US$ at the time of the experiments. Typically we target the size of payment to cover the 
average opportunity costs of the subjects. 10 Euro is probably an upper limit of the hourly costs for our student 
population. The opportunity cost for the managers is likely higher (perhaps not in all cases since the experiments 
were conducted during normal work hours). Given this (and tax law constraints), we increased manager payments 
by a factor of 4. We note that we saw no evidence of insufficient manager incentives. For instance, managers took as 
much time to conclude the experiments as students, performance both relative to the student population and across 
managers depended systematically on the information scenario (as we describe below), and the discussions in the 
debriefing phase with managers were characterized by a high degree of involvement, ambition and interest.  
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Table 3. Summary statistics, by treatment (n = number of subjects) 
 
Treatment  n  Mean Order  Mean Efficiency 
Freshmen Basic (FB)  32  54  0.854 
Freshmen Trained (FT)  22  65  0.932 
Managers Basic (MB)  26  56  0.865 
Managers Trained (MT)  23  62  0.905 
Grads Basic (GB)  31  57  0.883 
Grads Trained (GT)  30  70  0.964 
 
3.1  What experience leads to the best use of historical information?  Basic treatments. 
 
As discussed in the Introduction, previous research finds that student newsvendors tend to 
anchor their orders away from the optimal order towards average demand. Our focus in this 
subsection will be on the extent to which this pattern of bias extends to procurement managers in 
the basic treatments of the experiment.  
 
Observation 1. While all groups exhibit an anchoring bias in Period 1, Managers bias is 
significantly less than that of Freshmen or Graduates. Averaged over all of Phase 1, however, 
there is no significant difference in order quantities across groups.  
 
In Period 1, the only information subjects have to base a decision on is a description of the 
game (including economic parameters) and historical information on previous demand draws; 
they do not yet have any experience or feedback resulting from their own decisions.  Figure 5 
displays the Period 1 decisions.  All three groups exhibit the same qualitative pattern of 
anchoring bias with the mean order below the optimal order quantity in period 1 ordering; in all 
three cases, a one sample Wilcoxon test comparing with a fixed order quantity of 75 is highly 
significant (two tailed p < 0.002). The mean initial order for Freshmen, however, is almost 
exactly the average demand of 50, while for Graduates it is weakly significantly higher (two-
tailed Wilcoxon p = 0.093). The average initial order for Managers is strongly significantly 
higher than for students (two-tailed Wilcoxon p = 0.049 compared with Graduates, p = 0.002 
compared with Freshmen). Inferential tests on the efficiency of initial orders yield comparable 
results. So in Period 1, Managers outperform the students.  
That said, the performance difference is short lived.  Already in period 2, the average order 
of Managers is below that of either student group.  And averaged over all periods in Phase 1:  
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Managers order an average of 53.0 compared to 51.9 for Graduates and 49.2 for Freshmen. 
These differences are not significant at any standard level (the same is true for efficiency 
comparisons). These results might indicate that the Period 1 ordering difference is not robust. 
But they are also consistent with the search behavior that feedback on demand draws triggers; 
see Observation 5 in Subsection 3.2, here we note that the Period 1 demand draw was below 
average, 44, and average Manager orders moved lower in Period 2 (visible in Figure 6).  
 
Figure 5. Distribution of Period 1 order quantities, basic treatments 
















       
 
 
Observation 2. Within phases, none of the three subject groups show improvement, that is, the 
period has no significant effect on order quantities or efficiency.  
 
A second finding of previous newsvendor studies is that learning-by-doing, as measured by 
changes in average orders towards the optimal order quantity, is markedly slow (see 
Introduction). This is true for all three groups sampled in the present study, as can be observed in 







































































































































































































































































































































































We ran regression analyses to quantify the effect of learning by doing on mean orders ( t O ) 
and mean efficiencies ( t E ) per period (Table 4). We denote the time period by t (t = 1, 2, …, 
100). To control for subjects we ran a fixed effects model using indicator variables Si for each 
subject i. For the phases, we use indicator variables Phasej for phase j (j = 2, 3). The regressions 
confirm that no group shows any particular learning-by-doing proclivity; the only significant, 
non-negligible coefficient for t appears in the regression of the mean orders of Managers and this 
coefficient is small and negative, indicating a modest tendency for Manager orders to move away 
from the optimal order quantity as the number of repetitions increases. We conclude that 
experience gained by repetition is of no significant value. 
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Table 4. Effect learning by doing on mean orders and mean efficiencies, basic treatments:  
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To summarize the observations in this subsection, Managers largely exhibit the same 
qualitative pattern of ordering bias as do students: They anchor between the optimal order and 
average demand and they exhibit little longitudinal adjustment in this behavior. However, 
Managers outperform students in the opening period of play, with only historical information for 
guidance and prior to receiving any feedback on their own performance.  
3.2  What experience leads to the best use of analytical information?  
 
The information provided in Phase 2 (demand distribution) is sufficient to identify the 
optimal order quantity, and the information provided in Phase 3 (expected profit) may further 
support decision making in transforming demand information into the directly relevant expected 
profit information. In this subsection we focus on how well this information is, in fact, used and 
which group uses it best in the basic treatments of the experiment. 
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Table 5. Changes in mean orders and mean efficiencies between Phases 1 and 2 and between 
Phases 2 and 3 [Wilcoxon 2-tailed p-values], basic treatments 
 
  Demand Information    Expected profit information 
 
1,2 O Δ    
1,2 E Δ    
2,3 O Δ    
2,3 E Δ  
Freshmen 1.6   0.037   18.6   0.116 
 [0.210]    [0.004]    [0.000]    [0.000] 
Managers 0.8    0.025   11.7   0.083 
 [0.861]    [0.269]   [0.000]   [0.000] 
Graduates  3.5   0.056    15.5    0.080 
  [0.021]    [0.000]    [0.000]    [0.000] 
 
























































































































































Observation 3: While Managers do not much profit from demand information, students, 
especially Graduates, increase mean order quantities and efficiencies.  
 
From Figure 7, the introduction of demand information moves average order quantities 
modestly towards the optimal order quantity. Table 5 shows that these movements are highest for 
Graduates, less than half the amount for Freshmen, and less than a quarter for Managers.
4  
Moreover, the same table shows that, for both student groups, efficiency rises significantly with 
the addition of demand information, while there is a smaller and insignificant effect for 
Managers. Increases in efficiency are due to both modest increases in mean orders and decreases 
in search (as shown below, Observation 5).  
 
Observation 4: Expected profit information strongly improves mean order quantities and 
efficiencies for all subject groups, yet again more so for students.  
 
Returning to Figure 7, we see that the introduction of expected profit information in addition 
to demand information improves performance for all three groups. Table 5 shows that the effect 
is substantially larger than the effect of demand information both in terms of order quantities and 
efficiencies, and for all three groups. Applying two-tailed Wilcoxon tests, students generally gain 
more from adding profit information than Managers (p = 0.005 and 0.071 for order resp. 
efficiency improvement of Managers compared to Freshmen, and p = 0.081 and 0.665 compared 
to Graduates). Because, theoretically, profit information can be derived from the demand 
information, the Phase 3 effects also indicate that some subjects have difficulty transforming 
demand information into the relevant profit information by themselves.  That said, the next 
observation shows that the addition of analytical information does at least partially affect the 
approach that all groups take to the data: 
 
Observation 5: The amount of search behavior falls as information is added in Phases 2 and 3, 
consistent with the new information inducing a more analytical approach to ordering.  The 
reduction in search behavior is largest for Graduates and smallest for Managers.  
 
Most newsvendor learning-by-doing patterns involve search processes characterized by a 
substantial variability within a subject’s orders across time (as opposed to optimal ordering 
behavior which proscribes a constant order; see Bolton and Katok 2008). Table 6 presents an 
                                                 
4 Only the Graduates move is significant in Table 6. There is one difference in statistical significance if one takes 
into account possible repetition effects as shown in Table 4: Here, the Managers’ move also becomes significant, 
indicating that phase information may ‘compensate’ for moving away from the optimal order within phases.  
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analysis of how search behavior changes with the information phase. The regressions take as the 
dependent variable the standard deviation in orders calculated over 4-period blocks for each 
subject. Standard deviation is a proxy measure for the amount of individual search. The phase 
coefficients measure the reduction in search induced by the addition of new information. 
Observe from the table that the reductions are all strongly significant.  
 
Table 6. Changes in search behavior across phases, basic treatments:  




FB = diSi i=1




MB = diSi i=1




GB = diSi i=1
31 ∑ + 0.044⋅ k −9.13⋅ Phase2 − 12.88⋅ Phase3 0.284
[0.056] [0.000] [0.000]
 
                  
where k = 4, 8, 16,…, 100 and Dk is the standard deviation of a subject i 
calculated over periods k-3, k-2, k-1, k. 
 
The regression results in Table 6 also suggest that reductions in search behavior are larger for 
Graduates than for Managers, with Freshmen in between. To check this further, we ran Wilcoxon 
tests comparing individual standard deviation across groups; For Phase 1, there is no significant 
difference in standard deviations across groups (two-tailed p  > 0.39 for all comparisons). From 
Phase 1 to Phase 2 the within subject drop in standard deviation is greater for Graduates than for 
Managers or Freshmen (two-tailed p = 0.006 and 0.063).  From Phase 1 to Phase 3, the within 
subject drop in standard deviation for Graduate is greater than that for Managers (two-tailed p = 
0.012). Other comparisons are not significant at any standard level. Figure 8 confirms that the 
average standard deviation decreases as information is added in Phases 2 and 3.  In sum, 
information about the demand distribution helps students to reduce (inefficient) search in the 
face of fluctuating demand. Managers, however, are more like to continue relying on historical 
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Observation 6. Students and in particular Graduates make the best overall use of analytical 
information. As a result, Graduates outperform Managers in Phase 3. 
 
All three groups gain from the provision of analytical information, whether it be demand 
information or, additionally, expected profit information. However, as shown in Figure 7, 
students respond more strongly to both demand and profit information. In particular, when 
aggregating over the information effects, the improvements of Freshmen and Graduates from 
Phase 1 to Phase 3 regarding order quantities are significantly larger than the corresponding 
improvements of Managers (two-tailed Wilcoxon test, p = 0.017 for Freshman and p = 0.020 for 
Graduates; the corresponding values for efficiencies are p = 0.033 for Freshmen and p = 0.182 
for Graduates).  
As a result, while Managers initially perform better, both student groups perform better in 
Phase 3. Applying a two tailed Wilcoxon test, this is significant for Graduates (p = 0.016 for 
order quantities and p = 0.010 for efficiencies), but not significant for Freshmen (p = 0.164 for 
order quantities and p = 0.180 for efficiencies). It is important to note, however, that for all three 
groups, even in Phase 3, order quantities still average significantly less than 75 (Freshmen p = 
0.002, Managers p = 0.000, Graduates p = 0.021, all two-tailed.)   
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3.3  What experience leads to the best use of task training?   
 
Task training explains both the rationale for picking and method of computing the 
expected profit maximizing order quantity. The observation in this subsection concerns the 
influence of training on each of the experience groups. With training, as without, there is no 
significant learning-by-doing effect. Regressions similar to those presented in Table 4 exhibit an 
insignificant period coefficient (p > 0.27 in all cases). 
 
Table 7. Differences in mean orders and mean efficiencies between basic (B) and trained 
subjects (T) [two-sided p-values of Wicoxon test] 
 
  Phase  1  Phase  2  Phase  3 
  B, T O Δ     B, T E Δ     B, T O Δ     B, T E Δ     B, T O Δ     B, T E Δ  
Freshmen  12.85  0.100  15.22  0.094  0.30   0.002 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]   [0.329]    [0.197] 
Managers  7.25   0.058   7.29   0.041  0.99   0.004 
  [0.064]  [0.024]  [0.032]  [0.070]   [0.547]    [0.147] 
Graduates  16.10  0.112   16.1   0.084  2.24   0.014 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]   [0.573]    [0.194] 
 
Observation 7. During Phases 1 and 2, training improves performance significantly for all three 
groups. Training has little effect on Phase 3 performance for any group. As before, the effects 
are largest for students, and in particular for Graduates.  
 
Observe from Figure 7 and Table 7 that, for Phases 1 and 2, all three groups significantly 
improve on both performance measures. In Phase 3, training does not significantly improve 
performance beyond what expected profit information does with untrained subjects. Still, all 
subject groups reached their respective maximal performance with maximal information, namely 
in Phase 3 and with previous training. For instance, trained Graduates in Phase 3 perform almost 
optimally with average orders of 73.3 units and an average efficiency of 98.4 %. The average 
trained Manager order in Phase 3 is 66.6 units with an average efficiency of 94.4 %. While Phase 
3-performance of Graduates and Managers turn out not to be statistically different (two-tailed 
Wilcoxon test p = 0.124 for order and p = 0.164 for efficiencies), overall performance across all 
three phases is (p = 0.004 for orders and p = 0.002 for efficiency).  
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Demand and expected profit information have qualitatively similar effects on performance of 
trained and untrained subjects. However, since training already provides most of the relevant 
information, orders and efficiencies levels are much higher from the very beginning. As a result, 
the room for improvement is more limited for trained subjects, and so improvements from 
demand and expected profit information are only sporadically significant.
5  
 
4  Summary and discussion 
We observe a pattern of anchoring bias in ordering behavior in all three groups we study. 
Experienced managers as well as master-level graduate students who have done coursework in 
operations management and freshmen undergraduate students who have not, tend to make orders 
that are biased toward average demand away from the expected profit maximizing order 
quantity. Within information phases, we observe little adjustment in these orders from period-to-
period. As analytical information about the demand distribution and expected profits are 
introduced, orders adjust towards the expected profit maximizing quantity, although not all the 
way, and the search behavior associated with learning-by-doing diminishes somewhat. 
We find that out-of-task experience affects the way information is (or is not) utilized. 
Managerial experience was most valuable in the very beginning of the experiment, when the 
only information available about the underlying stochastic model is historical demand draws. In 
Period 1 of the game, managers exhibit somewhat less anchoring bias than either student group 
although this advantage is short-lived. Managers, like the students, engage in search behavior 
dependent on the individual performance feedback they get as the task is repeated.  With the 
introduction of information identifying the underlying demand distribution or additionally 
showing the expected profit associated with individual order quantities, the student groups catch 
up and the Graduates eventually outperform Managers for the basic treatments, without training. 
In all comparisons with the student groups and for both, demand and profit information, 
Graduates best utilized analytical information and Managers gained least from the information 
with respect to both order quantities and efficiencies. The experience that had the biggest effect 
on ordering behavior in our experiment was task training. It lifted the performance of all three 
groups in all three phases of the experiment. Although again, Graduates profited significantly 
                                                 
5 Graduates gain significantly more than Managers from expected profit information both in terms of orders and 
efficiency. Because the impact of training on search behavior is already partly captured by our efficiency measure 
and, in fact, analogous to the effect on efficiency, we drop the corresponding results here.  
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more than Managers, the latter moving least towards optimality and efficiency in response to 
training.  
One major implication of our findings has to do with the pros and cons of particular kinds of 
experience for solving procurement problems. That managers initially exhibit less bias than 
students (with only historical data on demand available for guidance) suggests that work 
experience leads to an intuitive feel for the solution to the newsvendor problem. That graduate 
students with an operations background are better at leveraging analytical information about the 
stochastic process behind the newsvendor problem than managers or freshmen undergraduates 
with no operations background suggests that classroom education provides important insight into 
the process behind the newsvendor solution. Consistent with this observation, training has a big 
effect on performance, particularly when it is coupled with an operations management 
background as in the case of the graduate students. However, the fact that Graduates perform 
better with the addition of training than without suggests that time lags play an important role in 
the effectiveness of classroom education. And the fact that theoretically redundant expected 
profit information strongly significantly improves performance across all subject pools suggests 
that overcoming the computational problems involved in the newsvendor problem is a challenge 
even with education and training. This observation also points to the potential value of decision 
support systems that take the cognitive limitations of decision makers into account. 
We mentioned in the Introduction that previous studies comparing managers and students 
had found that the framing of the experiment was critical to performance. While our experiment 
is model-based in the sense that we took the incumbent model of procurement as our guide for 
what the important elements of the newsvendor problem are (and what the solution is), it was 
couched in natural terms; specifically, in terms of product stocking, uncertain demand for that 
product and payoffs determined by costs and revenues. Yet managers performed less than 
optimally. This might indicate that inventory procurement in the field is being conducted 
suboptimally. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the parameters of the problem exactly 
matched the terms that our managers were familiar with from their field experience. So it might 
be that managers are conducting field procurement optimally for the special inventory problem 
they face, but do not understand enough about the more general underlying process to 
successfully translate their success to other parameterizations of the problem. It might also be 
that some inventory managers in the field are not motivated by a concern of profit maximization,  
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as assumed for the newsvendor solution, but are rather guided by aspirations or goals on, say, 
out-of-stock quotas (see Brown and Tang 2006). (Under none of these hypotheses would there be 
a reason to believe that Managers would have an advantage in finding the optimal, profit 
maximizing order of our newsvendor problem.)  
 
Table 8. Effect of years of working experience and position on Managers’ mean orders and mean 
efficiencies: Regression [two-tailed p-value] 
[0.725] [0.000] [0.029] [0.020]
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Position = 1 if simple employee (5 observations  in the basic treatment and 18 observations in the trained treatment), 
= 2 if team manager (6/1), = 3 if head of department (10/4), = 4 if board member (5/0). The Pearson correlations 
between position and years are 0.134 (p = 0.513) in the basic treatment and 0.627 (p = 0.001) in the trained 
treatment. 
 
While an altogether new investigation would need to be designed to separate these 
hypotheses, the regressions in Table 8 suggest that looking for years of working experience on 
the job and position in the firm is a promising starting point. In particular, our data indicates that 
for Managers, more Years of experience significantly reduces performance, while higher 
Position significantly improves performance as measured by deviation from the optimal order 
quantity and efficiency. That is, more years of work experience appear to make managers more 
resistant to utilizing the kind of analytical information needed in the newsvendor problem 
(controlling for position). This suggests that the standard formulation of the newsvendor 
problem, with its sole focus on profit maximization calculus, misses important aspects of 
everyday routine inventory decisions. Yet at the same time analytical skills related to the 
newsvendor model appear to be helpful in inventory careers (controlling for number of years  
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with work experience), probably suggesting that the standard approach is better suited to the 
larger, strategic picture of inventory decision making.
6 It would be interesting to extend 
experimental and theoretical research to an environment that includes more ‘artifactual’ features 
in real world procurement to see if these features are truly superfluous to the problem or if they 
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Appendix A. Materials used in the experiment 
 
A.1  Instructions given to subjects prior to the play of the newsvendor game (translated from 
German). 
 
Briefing   
  
You are a retailer who buys and sells a single generic product. In each period of the game you  
will order the product from an external supplier at a purchase price of   
 
Purchase Price = 3 TALER/unit. 
 
You will sell the product to customers at a sales price of   
 
Sales Price = 12 TALER/unit. 
  
You will play 100 periods with identical activities:  
 
1. Determination of purchase order quantity: At the beginning of each period you determine 
the order quantity. You can choose the order quantity freely. When you place the order, you do 
not know the customer demand of the period.  
 
2. Generation of customer demand: The computer generates a customer demand. The graph 
on the following page shows the demands of the 50 previous periods.  
 
3. Calculation of profit: The demand is filled and the profit of the period is computed. There 
are two different cases:  
 
a. Customer demand is less than or equal to order quantity: All customer demand can be 
filled. The profit is  
 
Profit = Sales Price * Customer Demand – Purchase Price * Order Quantity  
 
Profit = 12 TALER/unit * Customer Demand – 3 TALER/unit * Order Quantity  
 
Example: If the customer demand is 60 units and you ordered 80 units, each demand can 
be filled and the profit is  
 
         Profit = 12 TALER/unit * 60 units – 3 TALER/unit * 80 units = 480 TALER  
 
b. Customer demand is greater than order quantity: Only customer demands up to the 
order quantity can be filled. The profit is  
 
Profit = Sales Price * Order Quantity – Purchase Price * Order Quantity  
 
Profit = 12 TALER/unit * Order Quantity – 3 TALER/unit * Order Quantity  
 
Example: If the customer is 60 units and you ordered 40 units, only 40 units can be filled 
and the profit is  
 
Profit = 12 TALER/unit * 40 units – 3 TALER/unit * 40 units = 360 TALER  
 
4. Clearance of left over inventory: If your order quantity was greater than the demand, the 
remaining stock is disposed at no cost. In other words, remaining inventory is worthless and not 
carried over to following periods.   
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The roadmap of the game is as follows:  
 
1. Playing of 40 periods  
 
2. Short break and information of the player  
 
3. Playing of another 40 periods  
 
4. Short break and information of the player  
 
5. Playing of another 20 periods  
 
6. Calculation of average profit per period and compensation of participant: The exchange rate 
is 1 Euro = 11 TALER 
 
 




   
 
  
iii 
Feedback screen 
 
 
 